With breakeven inflation rates generally remaining well anchored on the Fed's 2 per cent inflation target, and the FOMC unanimously having determined only last October that negative policy rates were still undesirable, investors had not, until lately, seen any reason why the US central bank would follow the ECB and the BoJ into negative territory. But the COVID-19 economic crisis may be changing that.
After cutting policy rates to the assumed minimum level on 15 March, the range for the fed funds policy rate has been left at 0.0-0.25 per cent, and is therefore centred at 0.125 per cent (or 12.5 basis points). Initially, fed funds futures traded close to that central rate or at least 12 months into the future, implying that the market expected policy rates to be left unchanged for a lengthy period.
However, forward rates started to fall further in late April, and the 12-month forward rate actually fell very slightly into negative territory in early May, when doubts about the strength of the economic recovery began to rise. Furthermore, Harvard Professor Kenneth Rogoff released an influential article, arguing that the Federal Reserve should seek to cut policy rates "deeply" below zero - in fact, to minus 3.0% - in order to ease the monetary stance and reduce the burden of servicing much higher public and private debt after the pandemic.
One of the reasons that the Fed and some other central banks have opposed negative interest rates is that they believe there would be adverse consequences for bank profitability, which stem mainly from the expected behaviour of policy rates relative to both bank deposit rates and the shape of the yield curve. Based on experience in the Eurozone, it has been assumed that banks would not be able to pass the negative rates earned on their liquid deposits at the central bank on to small deposit holders, notably households. In addition, negative rates have caused a sustained flattening in the yield curve, probably the major determinant of bank profitability.
After a shift in the fed funds rate to -0.5%, the market is quite likely to build in the expectation that policy rates will remain below zero for many years, and also require a negative risk premium for holding longer dated bonds. (This negative risk premium would represent the risk that policy rates might go even lower than -0.5% before the duration of the long term bonds reaches expiry.)
This is probably why Chairman Powell continues to say that negative rates are not supported either by himself, or by any other member of the FOMC at present.
However, the subject is far from closed. A much larger shift in policy rates below zero might be possible if the Fed were willing to consider introducing the reforms recommended by Ken Rogoff. And the Bank of England, previously also a strong opponent of negative rates, seems to be reconsidering their position. This is a subject that will be watched carefully in future blogs in this series.